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Forty years ago, H.  Scott Gordon (1954) published a  try-sponsored buyout  program that is  conceived in a
seminal fisheries economics article warning that peren-  Wicksellian  tradition.
nially low incomes and overfishing were consequences  Unfortunately,  the entire ITQ literature is founded
of open-access fisheries management policies.  Fish in  on  a fallacy  of composition.  It  implicitly presumes
the  sea  belonged  to  no  one  and  thus,  everyone,  only the harvesting sector intervenes between the fish
Gordon used a very simple, highly stylized economic  resource  and  the  consumer.  This,  of  course,  is
model  to  show  that  lack  of well-defined  property  patently false for most fisheries;  the processing sector
rights  over ocean  fish stocks  encourages  over  capi-  typically  is  as  crucial  to  the  utilization  of  fishery
talization-too  many boats chasing too  few  fish--with  resources  as is  the  harvesting  sector.  Nevertheless,
fishing  seasons  compressing  into  Olympic-style  der-  fishery  economists  (and  limited but  growing  world-
bies.  Gordon's analysis  suggested a simple solution:  wide  applications)  have  only  considered  allocating
limit access to commercial fisheries primarily by using  transferable  quota shares  to harvesters.
property  rights  as  a way  of rationing  scarce  fishery  A  traditional  asymmetric  allocation  of rights  to
resources.  But  institutional  factors-most  notably  only  harvesters  misses  the  obvious.  Catching  and
international law--impeded the emergence of property  processing  sectors are co-dependent!  Any policy that
rights solutions.  Until the mid to late  1970s, most of  impacts the structure, conduct,  and performance of the
the world's  fishery resources  were  found  in interna-  catching  fleet necessarily  affects  the cost structure of
tional waters.  Rights-based  fishing couldn't  evolve  the processing sector.  (This, of course,  is not true for
until international law formally recognized in 1982 the  a vertically integrated catcher-processing/factory  trawl
200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) as national  fleet.)  The same open access property institutions  that
jurisdictions.  At thisjuncture, the rights-based fishing  caused  fleet  over-capitalization  and  the race  to  fish,
literature developed a clear theme that has become an  also  fostered  over-capitalization  in  the  processing
unnecessary source of tension between Japan and the  sector  which  built  up  to  meet  the daily  throughput
United States in North Pacific waters off the coast of  requirements  of open  access  fishing  derbies.  It  fol-
Alaska,  where  more  than  half of the  U.S.  fish  are  lows that policies to rid the harvesting sector of redun-
harvested.  dant capital necessarily  affect  the processing sector.
Clarification of nationaljurisdiction allowed fisher-  The quintessential feature of ITQ fisheries manage-
ies economists worldwide to champion the switch from  ment is that gains from trade require season elongation
open access  to an individual  transferable  quota  (ITQ)  as the fleet consolidates.  Season  elongation,  given a
system of  access limitation.  While rights to individual  constant  total  allowable  catch,  will  cause  the rate of
fish  could not be defined  until  they were harvested,  throughput to  drop below optimal design capacity  for
private  harvest  rights  could  easily  be  defined  as  all processors.  Processors  will experience  an excess
permanent,  transferable  and exclusive  rights to catch  demand  for  raw  fish,  causing  them  to  bid  up  the
a percentage of the total allowable  catch.  This  simple  exvessel  fish  price,  thereby  increasing  marginal  pro-
property rights solution would allow market exchange  cessing costs as they compete for a greater percentage
to  guide these  rights into the hands  of the most effi-  of a constant total allowable catch.  Great news if you
cient,  most inventive  firms.  The most efficient har-  fish--devastating if you process, particularly  in remote
vesters should be able to purchase quota shares from  western  Alaska where capital  is, for all practical pur-
the less efficient,  allowing the industry to consolidate  poses,  nonmalleable.
in a way that reflects maximum profitability.  Theoret-  In  essence,  an  ITQ  policy  designed  around  an
ically, no one should be made worse off by this indus-  asymmetric,  harvester-only  initial allocation is analo-
gous  to  a  "taking."  It  unintentionally  expropriates
quasi-rents  from the processing  sector and gives it to
Professor,  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,  the harvesting sector by forcing raw fish price conces-
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February  95/page  106  Journal of Food Distribution Researchsions on the processors without compensation.  While  Figure  2  provides  a  graphical  illustration  of  a
the extent of rent expropriation remains  an empirical  representative  surviving  processor's  potential  daily
question,  the expropriation mechanism is analytically  equilibrium position.  As raw fish price is bid up such
demonstrable,  that  P0 -"  P  -e  P2,  the  optimal  processing  rate
It suffices here to illustrate this proposition graphi-  declines:  R7 - R*  - V.  Raw fish demanded by
cally.  I shall,  for  the sake of pedagogy,  assume  the  ,.•~~~~~~~  .J-J,~~  ^,  ^competing  processors is declining as well.  It is possi- individual  quotas are nontransferable  (IQ rather  than individual  quotas  are nontransferable  (IQ rather  than  ble that a subset of less efficient  processors will shut
ITQ).  i  down operations  entirely  if Pp  - aP declines  below
Under  an  IQ  management  system,  fishers  no  their minimum nonfish average variable cost.  Equilib-
longer have to race to catch a fixed quota share.  Let  rium  is  attained  for a  surviving  processor  when  the rium  is  attained  for a  surviving  processor  when  the the daily harvest rate  for the fleet  decrease  such that  r  o  f  d  a  f  rate of fish delivenes  adjusted  for recovery,  aol,  is some or all processors  receive a reduced daily supply
of raw fish resulting  in a disequilibrium  situation,  as  equal to  the quantity  demanded,  aRpl.
depicted  in Figure  1 for  a  representative  processor.  Processors'  daily (QR) and per unit (UQR)  quasi-
Wholesale price  (Pp) net of raw fish cost adjusted for  rents are reduced under the IQ system.  The represen-
recovery  (aP) no longer equals the nonfish marginal  tative  processor's  daily  quasi-rents  are  reduced  in
cost of processing as the daily processing  throughput  Figure  2  from  a  level  of  QRp°  under  open-access
rate declines  from  1R  to  R.  It follows  that season  management  to  QR Q under  the  IQ  system.  Of
elongation  causes  the  processor  to  initially  lose  course,  processors  driven  out  of business have  had
QR-p  fQRlp  amount of daily quasi-rents, where QR' I Q their daily quasi-rents reduced to zero.  On a per unit
and  QRI'  indicate  lost  and  gained  quasi-rents,  basis,  the  surviving  processors'  quasi-rents  decline.
respectively.  The  representative  processor's  per  unit  quasi-rent
The processor  has  an  incentive  to  acquire  addi-  declines  from  UQRp° under open-access  management
tional  quantities  of  raw  fish  in  order  to  recapture  to  UQRQ  under the quota system.
quasi-rents and attempt to return to the optimal rate of  There will  always be  a subset of processors  who
production  iR  that  equates price  and marginal  cost.  experience uncompensated losses under the IQ system.
Increasing  the price  paid  for raw  fish is the mecha-  This  follows  from  the  fact  that processors'  per unit
nism by  which the  processor  attempts  to  attract  an  quasi-rents have been uniformly reduced and the same
increased  daily  raw  fish  supply;  the  processor  can  total  quantity  of fish will be processed under  the IQ
indeed  obtain  additional  fish  by offering  a  raw  fish  system  as  under  open  access  management.  In  the
price that exceeds that of the competition.  However,  event  that  all processors  continue  operating  at  their
other processors face similar incentives,  and competi-  original  (open access) seasonal  quantity of fish (albeit
tive bidding begins that only  serves  to  reallocate the  at  a slower  daily  rate  for  a longer  period  of opera-
total  daily catch among  competing  processors.  The  tion),  then  each would  suffer uncompensated  loss of
harvesters have no incentive to alter their optimal rates  seasonal  quasi-rents.  If  whole  season  processing
of harvesting  and thus,  the fleet harvest rate remains  levels were redistributed through inter-processor price
constant  as harvesters  accrue additional  quasi-rents.  competition, then the subset of processors who process
Assume that the processing sector's daily through-  less total fish under the IQ system necessarily  experi-
put rate remains sufficient  to at least meet transaction  ence uncompensated quasi-rent losses.  Of course, this
demands  through  time,  and  the market price  of pro-  latter set of processors may include those who experi-
cessed  fish product remains stable at Pp.  Competitive  ence a  total loss of quasi-rents  due  to plant  closure.
bidding  among processors  for raw fish supplies  will  Also, note that even processors who gain market share
increase.  This, in turn,  decreases the spread  (Pp - aP)  could lose  seasonal  quasi-rents  to  the harvesting  sec-
between  the  wholesale  product  price  and  exvessel  tor.
price adjusted for product recovery,  which lowers the  Relaxing the nontransferability  assumption  so that
processor's  target optimal production  rate of finished  harvesting  rights  are  fully  transferrable  under  ITQ
product below  R1 . Competition among processors for  management merely exaggerates the foregoing conclu-
fish supplies will continue until equilibrium is reestab-  sons.  Catchers  will  consolidate  due  to  gains  from
lished whereby surviving processors no longer have an  trade,  which  further  elongates  the  season  and  thus,
incentive to bid up the price of raw fish.  The market  further reduces the daily rate of processing.  Uncom-
is in equilibrium when P has been bid up to the point  pensated losses will accrue to the less efficient proces-
where  the sum of the processor's  raw  fish demands  industry.  The more  efficient
equal  the rate of fish delivery by the harvesting fleet.  processors that remain in business will eventually exit
if they do not earn at least a normal profit.  Expropri-
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Figure  1.  Daily Processor Disequilibrium Under IQ Management
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Figure 2.  Daily  Surviving  Processor's Equilibrium
February 95/page  108  Journal  of Food Distribution Researchation  of any  or all of their  status  quo  quasi-rents  is  the  highest  average  quality.  A  slower-paced  ITQ
also  uncompensated.  fishery  would  allow  daily  production  decisions  to
So what  does  this  have to  do  with international  better reflect market demand for different  qualities.
tensions in the North Pacific  seafood industry?  Japan  Season  elongation  will  also  challenge  the  entire
is heavily invested in North Pacific crab  and ground-  North  Pacific  seafood  distribution  system  that  cur-
fish processing.  The five principal  on-shore proces-  rently  is  geared  up  for pulse  fisheries.  Surimi  is
sors collectively account  for upwards of a one billion  shipped to Japan by containerized shipping firms, like
dollar investment in crab and groundfish  processing.  SeaLand,  and also foreign trampers.  It would appear
Four of these five firms are partially or wholly owned  that  derby-style  fisheries,  coupled  with  limited  and
by Japanese companies.  expensive  cold  storage  facilities  in  remote  western
Regulatory  deprivation  of all  or  partial  econo-  Alaska,  provide the scale economies  essential to low-
mically  beneficial use of an investment is arguably  a  cost containerized  shipping.  How season  elongation
"taking"  under  the  Fifth  Amendment  of  the  U.S.  will reconfigure  the distribution system is unclear.
Constitution,  particularly  when  the  deprivation  is  Professional  associations,  like the Food Distribu-
incidental to the intent of the regulation.  ITQ manage-  tion  Research  Society,  can  help  guide  the  seafood
ment policy is intended to regulate/manage only  fish-  industry toward  sensible, if not optimal,  reconfigura-
ing activities.  Any coincidental  frustration of invest-  tion.  But  for  this  to  occur,  marketing  economists
ment-backed  economic expectations in the processing  must begin collaborations  now with both  the seafood
sector (e.g.,  expropriation of processors'  quasi-rents)  industry  and with  fisheries  economists  who,  in  my
may require compensation.  Moreover,  on September  opinion,  are  trapped  by  the  myopic  focus  of  their
7,  1994, the U.S. Department of Commerce,  Office of  subdiscipline  and  their  zeal  to  promote  rights-based
the Chief Counsel for International  Commerce issued  fishing.
a legal opinion concerning  foreign ownership of quota
shares  under  prospective  North  Pacific  ITQ  policy.  Endnotes
Citing  various  bi-lateral  treaties  with Japan  and  the
GATT agreement,  the NOAA opinion argued foreign-  1.  The main conclusions that follow do not change if
owned on-shore processors could not be discriminated  instead Pp is assumed to increase with the reduced
against on the grounds of corporate  ownership.  daily rate of processing.  The main difference  is
Fortunately,  there is a simple, albeit controversial,  the degree  to  which harvesters  accrue  additional
solution  to  the  apparent  ITQ  dilemma.  Redefine  quasi-rents,  which increase further.
property rights so they are symmetrical.  One symmet-
rical initial allocation  is to assign harvesting rights to  2.  It is theoretically possible that gains in intra-sector
fishers  on  some historical  catch basis  and processing  efficiency  could  increase  processing  quasi-rents.
rights to processors  on an historical  processing  basis.  However,  this  possibility  seems  remote.  North
This "2-pie" initial allocation recognizes  the co-depen-  Pacific groundfish  and crab  processing  firms tend
dence of harvesting and processing activities.  It pro-  to be technologically  similar.  Gains in efficiency
motes the desired gains from quota share trading while  arising  from  processing  sector  consolidation  are
assuring all trades are  fully compensated.  Questions  likely to be small.
of international and constitutional law become  irrele-
vant.  Attention then could turn to other matters that  3.  Surimi is the highly processed  fish product that is
are completely overlooked by academic fisheries econ-  subsequently  reprocessed  into  finished  products
omists and industry,  alike,  who are narrowly  focused  like  artificial  crab.  It  is  the  most  important
on ITQ policy implementation.  groundfish product in the North Pacific.
The  inevitable  season  elongation  that  will  occur
because  of a  shift  from  open-access  management  to
ITQ management poses new challenges and opportuni-
ties  for  seafood  marketing  and  distribution.  For
example,  season  elongation  creates  opportunities  for
altering  product  mix  that  better  take  advantage  of
market  niches  and  associated  price  differentials.
Consider the case of surimi production from  ground-
fish.  Short  fishing  seasons  that  result  from  open-
access management policies leave little opportunity for
surimi  processors  to  produce  a  broad  spectrum  of
surimi qualities.  Instead,  their strategy is to produce
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